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Abstract The article explores Thomas Christiano’s account of the moral division of 
labor in democracy. Christiano’s incorporation of experts serves the purpose of al-
leviating the epistemic burdens of ordinary citizens in the decision-making process 
and decreasing the amount of work they would otherwise be required to take on 
in a modern democracy. The gist of my contribution to the debate is assessing 
whether Christiano’s account successfully tackles the issues brought about by cog-
nitive biases that people suffer from in communicating their values in decision- 
making. I argue that Christiano’s notion of experts needs to be extended to choice 
architects, who possess the knowledge on methods for influencing choice. I also 
claim that choice architecture is a social fact that an informed deliberative demo-
cratic theory needs to deal with.
Keywords epistemic deliberative democracy, experts, choice architecture, de-
mocracy architects, cognitive biases, framing effects
In his article, “Rational deliberation 
among experts and citizens” (2012), 
Thomas Christiano tackles the issue of 
how a deliberative conception of democ-
racy might accommodate the contribu-
tion of experts into decision-making, 
while retaining its egalitarian character 
and democratic authenticity. Thus, Chri-
stiano joins the ranks of philosophers 
aiming to establish a normative account 
of a proper division of labor between 
ordinary citizens and experts (Kitcher, 
2011; Festenstein, 2009; Goldman, 2001). 
Christiano argues that a realistic con-
ception aims to assign roles to citizens, 
politicians and experts so that citizens 
“are essentially in the driver’s seat with 
regard to the society”, and they are in it 
“as long as they choose the basic aims 
the society is to pursue” (2012: 33). The 
way in which citizens are in control of 
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the steering wheel is specified through a 
variety of mechanisms making sure that 
decision-making is truth-sensitive but 
also exposing policy-making to public 
scrutiny and providing for democratic 
accountability. Utilizing his esoteric eru-
dition, the expert’s role is to contribute 
to the process of policy-making in order 
to set it on the road of scientific truth- 
responsiveness. These policy means are 
responsive to social aims set by citizens 
in public deliberation, a process that also 
determines whether the means and aims 
are properly constrained by egalitarian 
justice (2012: 27). With reference to the 
division of labor debate, Christiano’s 
view may be coined deliberative exper-
tism.
Christiano, however, limits his dis-
cussion to those experts who contribute 
to public deliberation by offering their 
specialized testimony. These experts 
most ly assume two roles: 1) they offer 
their knowledge in a way that is under-
standable to the general public in de-
bates at the outset of public deliberation, 
and 2) at the receiving end they filter 
deliberated aims of citizens on the basis 
of scientific fact and aid in their techni-
cal configuration into public policy. My 
article will aim to prove that this under-
standing of expertise and its relation to 
deliberative processes is too narrow. The 
game-changers that I here have in mind 
are often referred to as choice architects. 
The term is borrowed from Richard 
Thaler and Cass Sunstein (2008), denot-
ing social actors who assume roles in 
which they are able to predictably shape 
social environments in a way that is re-
sponsive to reported human cognitive 
biases. Not only are these actors cogni-
zant of people’s bounded rationalities 
and the means of directing their behav-
ior but also of the fact that covert policy 
influences frequently escape the public 
eye, although these policy influences of-
ten shape daily actions. Note, however, 
that this article is by no means looking 
to scoff Christiano’s deliberative ideal, to 
expose it as some naïve normative enter-
prise or to reinstate old problems in a 
new light, such as that of the principal 
agent or the many instances of male-
volent public manipulation. This article 
mere ly incorporates choice environments, 
choice architecture, bounded rationality 
and cognitive biases – all inescapable 
facts of social life – into an informed 
theory of democracy. My con tribution 
to Christiano’s efforts, in that sense, re-
mains on the idealistic side. It does, 
however, introduce a cognitive realism 
that somewhat escapes the ideal and de-
mands concessions and constraints with 
regard to what endorsers of deliberative 
democracy can require and reasonably 
expect of deliberation.
The article will discuss a particular 
type of choice architect. I will refer to 
this group as democracy architects. These 
agents are aware of factors detrimental 
to the invariance principle1 and are in a 
position to either shape the cognitive 
environment in which the democratic 
debate is taking place or twist the way in 
which individuals come to particular 
decisions about identical yet differently 
presented problems. The article is struc-
tured in the following way: in the first 
section, I provide a more in-depth anal-
1 In rational choice theory, the principle of in-
variance states that different representations 
of the same choice, in the sense that it offers 
identical options, should generate invariant 
preferences with decision makers. See, for 
example, Tversky and Kahneman (1986) and 
Slovic (1995). More on the invariance prin-
ciple will be said in the third section of the 














































ysis of Christiano’s deliberative ideal, 
with special attention given to his notion 
of expertise and its democratic appro-
priation. The second section discusses 
choice architecture and its application in 
democratic theory. Democracy archi-
tects, various cognitive heuristics in de-
cision-making and the collapse of the 
principle of invariance are discussed in 
the third section. The fourth, and final, 
section offers some concluding remarks 
about whether my expansion of relevant 
expertise relying on choice architecture 
delivers a blow to Christiano’s delibera-
tive expertism or may be incorporated 
into it with appropriate concessions.
1. Christiano’s Deliberative Expertism
Christiano’s deliberative expertism 
belongs to the family of views often labe-
led epistemic deliberative democracy. 
Views belonging to this family construe 
deliberation as consisting of both intrin-
sic value – as it is claimed to guarantee 
equal consideration and respect for all of 
its participants – and instrumental value 
– as it is thought that there is something 
about the features of deliberation that 
leads to good democratic decisions. Yet 
the second assertion may be difficult to 
establish – citizens often find themselves 
at odds with one another in irresolvable 
stalemates and may often lack the know-
how to arrive at good decisions. In such 
conditions, outcomes will often arise 
from misconceptions and prejudice, and 
will be lacking in technical erudition. 
With decision-making in contemporary 
society becoming increasingly complex 
and requiring specialized knowledge 
and skills, laypersons may arrive at qual-
ity decisions more often by virtue of 
serendipity than the character of their 
deliberation with their peers. Matters of 
law and economics, as well as other spe-
cialized fields of inquiry, and their incor-
poration into public policies are, as 
Christiano notes, “too complex and ex-
tensive for most citizens to have a good 
grasp of ”, not for “lack of native talent 
but simply because each citizen has a job 
of their own to do and these latter activ-
ities are themselves full-time jobs” (2012: 
31). Time constraints together with ex-
haustion will often prevent people from 
fully understanding the technical side of 
political issues just as the policy propos-
als that are brought to resolve them.
An obvious step is the employment 
of experts. They are to relieve ordinary 
citizens from the bulk of technical issues 
and facilitate quality decision-making. 
Experts are crucial in an epistemic con-
ception of democracy, as the specialized 
knowledge and skills of experts repre-
sent an invaluable resource in arriving at 
good decisions and in weeding out infe-
rior ones. A number of important nor-
mative questions can be raised about 
this inclusion. What is the proper bal-
ance between the roles of experts and 
citizens, if, as Christiano suggests, we 
also want to encourage participation in 
public deliberation and preserve the 
principle of democratic equality? How 
do we shape deliberation so that every-
one has “the opportunity to participate 
in influencing the process of discussion” 
and that their interests are “properly tak-
en into account” (2012: 27)? What is the 
content of deliberation between citizens 
and experts, i.e. how much is left to citi-
zens and how much is taken away from 
them? How do we make sure that public 
policy is truth-sensitive, that is, respon-
sive to up-to-date findings in the scienc-
es? How is it ensured that democracy 
does not mutate into epistocracy with 
























cratic process? Should we even be wor-
ried about such an eventuality? These 
matters are often shelved under the con-
troversy of a moral division of labor.
Christiano ascribes a reduced role to 
citizens in the collective pursuit of good 
decisions and policies once experts enter 
into public deliberation. Yet he believes 
citizens to essentially be in the “driver’s 
seat of society as long as they choose the 
basic aims the society is to pursue”, and 
by these, he means “all the non-instru-
mental values and the trade-offs between 
those values” (2012: 33).2 This contribu-
tion to public deliberation is more or less 
sufficient if the rest of the political sys-
tem is performing its functions properly, 
claims Christiano. These functions re-
side, to put it simply, in translating the 
values into working public policy. The 
way citizens opt for a particular set of 
aims is not, for the most part, by voicing 
them in the public arena but by choosing 
between prepared aim packages and the 
representatives who forward them, ei-
ther in formal elections or in civil socie-
ty groups (2012: 33). Christiano’s sug-
gestion is that the formation of proper 
packages of aims is a lengthy process 
that demonstrates sensitivity towards 
sets of values citizens come to endorse, 
as well as changes in these values, since a 
failure to do so endangers the political 
longevity of neglectful political organi-
zations. Citizens do not tailor the pack-
ages of aims themselves but are mostly 
in the consumer’s role within a demo-
cratic system which, ideally, tries to cater 
to their preferences, at least as far as 
general aims are concerned. Citizens are 
able to cultivate deep understanding of 
values and of their interests, although 
2 The choice of values is, however, constrained 
by principles of egalitarian justice.
they need mediators (politicians and 
civil society organizations) to process 
their aims. Christiano claims that con-
troversies over aims and values are much 
less in need of expertise than other areas 
of democratic decision-making (2012: 
34).3 Experts, however, are given the ca-
3 There is, however, some ground to contest 
this assertion. First, Emma Bullock argues 
that individuals might come up short in ac-
cumulating all the external information that 
relates to the content of their values. She 
writes: “Given that the content of certain 
values–such as religious tenets–are external 
to the individual (in the sense that they do 
not originate in the individual’s imagina-
tion), it is plausible that her judgment of the 
option that best protects her values can be 
mistaken” (Bullock, 2014: 6). As an example, 
she mentions the case of a Muslim patient 
who wrongly judges that he cannot receive 
an intravenous serum in order not to break 
his fast, while religious doctrine clearly 
states otherwise. It may be argued, however, 
that individuals can be at fault regarding 
their values only when they explicitly con-
form these values to what an external au-
thority proclaims. Religion is one candidate 
for these cases, as most religions and their 
followers recognize central authority when 
interpreting sacred doctrine and the values 
that are thus derived. But many religions in 
liberal regimes have allowed their followers 
more elbow room to assess which values are 
more important to them in forming their 
conceptions of a good life without the threat 
of being castigated or ostracized for it. This 
would imply that the external conditions re-
garding the correctness of one’s values in 
some of these situations have been reduced 
or toned down. Also, assuming that individ-
uals are driven in political deliberation by 
political values and not religious ones, it 
should be noted that political authorities are 
even more lenient about allowing individu-
als to decide the conditions under which 
their values are correct. It may still happen, 
however, that individuals advocate for mu-
tually contradictory values. They either fail 
to notice these contradictions or are not 














































pacity to filter out some theories and 
aims in this part of deliberation, if they 
are found to be incompatible with scien-
tific findings (Christiano, 2012: 42).
Still, citizens’ tasks in deliberative 
expertism do extend beyond the choice 
of values. Christiano acknowledges citi-
zens’ indirect role in evaluating whether 
the political system and its employed 
experts in the policies made for the ben-
efit of the citizens faithfully pursue the 
aims citizens have chosen (2012: 34, 36).4 
Additionally, they should influence the 
“generation and evaluation of the scien-
tific theories by which the public policy- 
making process is informed” (2012: 34).
This picture of the moral division of 
labor in deliberative democracies is still 
overly simplified. To add depth, Chris-
tiano introduces three distinct levels of 
political deliberation: one is occupied by 
lay citizens, one by politicians and ad-
ministrators and one by experts of dif-
of an epistemic deliberative democracy 
should tackle these issues. In the rest of the 
article, however, I will hold Christiano’s as-
sumption to be true and ignore the issue of 
citizens being wrong about their values. In-
stead, I will move on to a different problem: 
whether citizens can be wrong about ex-
pressing their values or understanding what 
represents them. 
4 It is not particularly clear what Christiano 
means by an ‘indirect role’. On  a stronger 
understanding, it might entail that agencies 
are to be established that would track the 
progress of implemented policy, assess the 
outputs to see if the general aims have been 
achieved and then put the accumulated in-
formation at the disposal of ordinary citi-
zens. A weaker reading might entail that cit-
izens are to be informed about the existence 
of particular policies that are pursued for the 
purposes of the expressed aims, but this 
need not include mediators who are to in-
crease transparency for citizens. In this case, 
the policy’s faithfulness to the aims would 
only be assessed by observing the outcomes. 
ferent fields (although the last being 
highly stratified):
This is the network of intellectual la-
bourers that spans the universities, 
political parties, political staffers, in-
terest group association, and parts of 
the administration. These are experts 
in economics, sociology, law, politi-
cal science, and the natural sciences. 
They influence the making and eval-
uation of policy. But they also mo-
nitor the processes and outcomes of 
po licy- making and can broadcast 
their opinions on these matters 
(Chri stiano, 2012: 35).
The deliberation among experts is 
conceptualized as mostly a contribution 
to policy-making and an evaluation of 
already implemented policy. Experts are 
expected to offer information that is oth-
erwise unavailable or difficult to obtain 
in the process of policy-making. In other 
words, they are thought to bring some-
thing to the table for a more in-depth 
discussion or point to policy aspects in 
which scientific depth is lacking. Chris-
tiano believes that the truth-responsive-
ness of policy-making to scientific con-
tributions can be enhanced in demo-
cratic circumstances where the civil 
society is strong and diverse enough to 
represent different social perspectives. 
These perspectives would include a vari-
ety of expert positions that take part in 
controversial debates, which would en-
sure that a particular group does not 
dominate over policy proceedings (Chri-
stiano, 2012: 36). The task of a normative 
account is then to capture an acceptable 
moral division of labor between the dif-
ferent groups, that is, to set a standard 
for how different levels of deliberation 
are to communicate and influence each 
other. Christiano’s position is that de-
mocracy does indeed possess mecha-
























ing process is not insulated either from 
experts or citizens. The nature of these 
lines of communication will be discuss-
ed later.
Christiano’s notion of experts is tak-
en from Alvin Goldman (2001). The no-
tion suggests that an individual can be 
regard ed an expert in a particular area if 
he has:
(1) an amount of true beliefs that is 
significantly greater than ordinary 
people and that meets a threshold 
with respect to: (i) the subject matter 
in a domain; and (ii) the ideas and 
arguments within the community of 
persons who have a lot of true pri-
mary beliefs concerning the subject 
matter in the domain; and (2) a set of 
skills that enable that person to test 
the ideas and arguments as well as 
extend the ideas and arguments of 
the community to new problems and 
objects within the domain (Chris-
tiano, 2012: 36-37)
In many areas of expertise, the truth 
values of certain statements will be hard-
ly ascertained by those outside of the 
group. Christiano refers to these state-
ments as “esoteric” (2012: 37). One of 
the democratic mechanisms that Chris-
tiano describes as helpful in trying to 
overcome esotericism is overlapping 
under standing, which allows groups 
without overlapping expertise to com-
municate with each other with the help 
of mediating groups that have parts of 
the relevant expertise at their disposal. 
An example of this is the following:
The economist can explain much of 
what they understand to the policy 
analyst. The analyst can explain what 
they understand of this, coupled 
with a knowledge of the legal and 
political background to the politi-
cian or staffer or perhaps to relatively 
sophisticated journalists. The jour-
nalists and politicians can explain 
what they understand to ordinary 
citizens. These chains of overlapping 
intelligibility enable politicians and 
citizens to have some appreciation of 
the reasons for and against particu-
lar policies. It enables politicians to 
make legislation that takes into ac-
count the best theorizing available in 
the society even if they do not them-
selves fully understand the theories. 
And it enables politicians and citi-
zens to see to some extent how and 
to what extent the aims they have 
chosen are actually realized in policy 
or not (Christiano, 2012: 39-40).
This cascading of information thro-
ugh overlapping understanding suggests 
that Christiano’s position on the moral 
division of labor recognizes the impor-
tance of the form in which the content 
relevant for policy-making is presented 
to non-experts. Yet Christiano’s experts’ 
main area of influence is still the con-
tent, while discussions about form and 
overcoming esotericism are only instru-
ments for a successful transmission of 
expert information. The inclusion of 
choice architects should widen Chris-
tiano’s list of experts, as well as bring 
about certain overlaps in the three levels 
of deliberation he outlines. If we indeed 
accept choice architects as legitimate 
experts in an epistemic deliberative de-
mocracy, we may come to accept their 
role in setting the frame for the delibera-
tion of citizens. This topic will be dealt 
with in more detail in the following sec-
tions.
1.1. Some preliminary considerations  
 and objections
The purpose of this sub-section is to 
show what may be at issue with Chris-














































may need to extend or revise it and how 
choice architecture might help. I will 
begin by posing Jamie Kelly’s objection 
to a more general epistemic deliberative 
view.
Kelly’s book Framing Democracy: A 
Behavioral Approach to Democratic The-
ory (2012) argues for constraints in our 
understanding of democratic theory and 
our expectations of democratic decision- 
making, supporting them with empirical 
findings about framing effects. A fram-
ing effect, according to Kelly, “occurs 
when different but equivalent formula-
tions of a problem result in substantively 
different decisions being made. Thus, 
our susceptibility to framing effects re-
veals that our decisions are not invariant 
across equivalent formulations of the 
same problem” (2012: 3).5 The preva-
lence of framing effects is particularly 
important for the notion of an epistemic 
deliberative democracy which attempts 
to utilize democracy’s epistemic poten-
tial. If deliberative democracy is justified 
by the assertion that deliberation is help-
ing to achieve the instrumental goal 
specified earlier – that of producing cor-
rect decisions – then its advocates need 
to show how it overcomes citizens’ sys-
tematic errors in decision- making (Kel-
ly, 2012: 89). In other words, they need 
to show why the problem of framing ef-
fects, or other cognitive biases, is over-
stated.
Endorsers of Christiano’s delibera-
tive expertism may claim that Christiano 
successfully overcomes these difficulties 
in two ways. First, he acknowledges that 
individual citizens are incompetent when 
complex decision-making on policy 
5 More on framing effects and Kelly’s thoughts 
on their influence on plausible modes of 
democratic theory will be said in the third 
section.
pro posals and implementation is requir-
ed. Second, he employs experts in his 
deliberative model precisely in order to 
unburden citizens from the requirement 
of correctness. But these responses are 
inadequate. The first misses the point 
because Christiano and Kelly discuss 
different kinds of incompetence – Chris-
tiano talks of time constraints and limit-
ed spans of attention, while Kelly analyz-
es cognitive constraints – and it is cer-
tainly more obvious that expertise deals 
with the incompetence of the first kind.6 
The second claim does indeed settle part 
of the problem of correctness but it does 
not unburden citizens of requirements 
for correctness entirely. Instead, the in-
clusion of experts only relocates the re-
quirements to the tasks Christiano en-
trusts to ordinary citizens. The citizens 
need to be ‘correct’ in expressing their 
aims and values to politicians and ex-
perts. Politicians and experts, in turn, 
need to be ‘correct’ in picking up on 
these aims and values. Citizens also need 
6 It should be added that Christiano’s experts 
may aid in overcoming cognitive biases in 
decision-making, as I will argue later in this 
article. The extended notion of experts that I 
will advocate will widen the range of indi-
viduals that can point out to lay citizens 
what kind of biases they should be on the 
lookout for. A more radical reading would 
be that the very incorporation of experts 
into democracy seriously reduces the detri-
ment of cognitive heuristics of ordinary citi-
zens, as individuals are given fewer opportu-
nities for decision-making mistakes. I do 
not believe Christiano would advocate this, 
as he is committed to keeping ordinary citi-
zens in democracy’s driver’s seat. Hence, al-
though it might be claimed that Christiano’s 
proposals do, in fact, aid in reducing the 
detriments of cognitive biases as a side-ef-
fect, I do not believe they are designed to do 
so, and I will later argue that they are insuffi-
cient for this task. I would like to thank 
























to have an adequate understanding of 
how their biases may influence them in 
assessing the validity of policies that are 
implemented or are in the process of 
implementation, as well as how particu-
lar policies themselves may influence 
them in making further assessments.
Christiano states that he wants the 
division of labor in his deliberative ex-
pertism to be realistic (2012: 33), and in 
order to achieve this, he will need to in-
corporate empirical findings regarding 
cognitive heuristics.7 Kelly specifically 
7 There may also be other reasons why Chris-
tiano’s proposal for a division of labor 
should be considered lacking in realism. 
One objection that can be posed is that the 
way Christiano envisions the composition of 
aim packages is inaccurate in realistic demo-
cratic settings. As far as political parties are 
concerned, they may at times be interested 
in isolating the aim packages they represent 
from those of other groups but if they calcu-
late that particular aims will draw a lot of 
votes, they may attempt to show that their 
package also includes them (and possibly 
that their package represents them even 
more faithfully than the other party’s pack-
age). This means aim packages will more of-
ten tend to widen rather than shrink as part 
of the goal to appeal to voters. As a conse-
quence, individuals will have no choice but 
to vote for aim packages substantially wider 
than their value sets. If we insist on a top-
down approach, a more accurate description 
of party activity during an election with re-
gard to aim packages might be that parties 
aim to persuade the electorate that their pro-
posed set of policies is compatible with a 
wide set of loosely defined values and core 
political beliefs. Democracy should, then, 
include as many opportunities for the direct 
expression of aims through minipublics and 
referenda to limit the extent to which parties 
can associate their programs to an overly 
wide set of values. Another objection per-
taining to realistic expectations is Chris-
tiano’s optimism that political parties will 
generally “attempt to make their general 
platforms consistent with one or another of 
emphasizes feasibility as the upshot of a 
theory that involves the data on framing 
effects into its normative considerations. 
The omission of empirical data on realis-
tic cognitive constraints and disposi-
tions in democratic theory leads to a 
general denial of that theory’s relevance 
for the evaluation of what democracy 
can offer (Kelly, 2012: 70). Similarly, Kel-
ly warns, a normative theory of democ-
racy must not become preoccupied with 
its empirical components, as that would 
mitigate its capacity for criticizing the 
status quo (Kelly, 2012: 70). Cognitive 
heuristics are rarely treated as insur-
mountable factors in reaching correct 
decisions (whatever we might mean by 
‘correct’).
Our focus should then be on wheth-
er Christiano’s moral division of labor in 
an epistemic deliberative democracy is 
successfully geared towards surmount-
ing the biases that I will mention in the 
following sections. There are individu-
als, I will claim, who fit Christiano’s no-
tion of experts and who are proficient in 
identifying choice-making situations in 
which individuals (not only laypersons) 
come up short in making fully reasoned 
decisions due to breakdowns in their 
cognitive circuitry. These experts are also 
successful in designing decision-making 
situations of this kind. Is this problemat-
ic for a democratic theory with a stand-
ard for correctness, even if we limit it to 
individuals expressing their value sets or 
assessing policy? I will claim that choice 
architects fit Christiano’s bill for experts, 
the best [scientific] theories”, as many people 
are looking at the creation of these platforms 
(2012: 46). But advocates of at least one 
model in the public policy literature – that 
of the advocacy coalition framework – claim 
that core policy beliefs may remain fairly 
untouched by advancement in scientific re-














































but their inclusion will seem unusual as 
Christiano mostly describes experts in 
their table-top contributions to debates. 
The operations of choice architects, on 
the other hand, will often run ‘under 
the table’ (although the metaphor, I be-
lieve sounds much more sinister than it 
should).
2. Choice Architects as Experts
Jennifer Blumenthal-Barby offers the 
most comprehensive account of choice 
architecture. There are two phenomena, 
she claims, established by the cognitive 
heuristics literature that relate to peo-
ple’s inhibitions in their attempts at en-
suring their future well-being. The bad 
choice phenomenon states that individu-
als fall victim to cognitive biases, mostly 
having to do with leaning towards short-
term consequences in predictable ways, 
while organizing their lives around long-
term goals. The influence phenomenon, 
on the other hand, states that environ-
ments in which people make choices 
may affect behavior in logically irrele-
vant ways (Blumenthal- Barby, 2013: 178). 
When the second phenomenon is con-
sciously and effectively used by individ-
uals to influence the first, choice archi-
tecture occurs. Choice architects are in-
dividuals who possess an understanding 
of the cognitive factors that deter indi-
viduals from arriving at choices that are 
good for them, but are also capable of 
tweaking choice environments so that a 
particular sort of behavior is purpose-
fully made more frequent.
The discussion on the bad choice 
phenomenon is most commonly fo-
cused on individuals making choices 
that are bad for them, not only in the 
sense that they would regret making 
them in retrospect, but that these choic-
es are, in the conventional sense, directly 
detrimental to their well-being. This 
comes as no surprise as the literature on 
choice architecture mostly focuses on 
self-regarding, rather than other-regard-
ing considerations – the latter being 
choices that are bad for others, or for the 
creation or preservation of some public 
good. There is no conceptual reason why 
this should be the case. The way in which 
these cognitive biases are described does 
not rule out their effects on individual 
contributions to public decisions. Let me 
illustrate this with a few examples: The 
status quo bias predicts “a more general 
tendency [for individuals] to stick with 
their current situations” (Thaler and 
Sunstein, 2008: 34). Although this ten-
dency for inertia produces a lot of bad 
self-regarding effects, such as neglecting 
retirement and saving plans or sticking 
with different kinds of paid subscrip-
tions, a very famous example – that of 
organ donation – shows it may similarly 
affect other-regarding considerations. In 
other words, there are no tangible bene-
fits for individuals to participate in or-
gan donation programs (apart from, 
perhaps, personal satisfaction about 
choosing what they wanted to choose), 
and the status quo bias may hinder them 
in their motivation to help others. The 
availability bias causes individuals “to 
assess the frequency of a class or the 
probability of an event by the ease with 
which instances or occurrences can be 
brought to mind” (Tversky and Kahne-
man, 1974: 1127). This means individu-
als will often be bad at assessing the risk 
of certain choices and place greater 
weight on those that are more mentally 
evocative, arguably in both self-regard-
ing and other-regarding considerations. 
Another cognitive effect, that of ‘just 
world beliefs’, suggests a psychological 
hindrance in pursuing egalitarian ideals, 
as individuals “operate under the as-
























commonly expressed in the psychologi-
cal literature as ‘people get what they 
deserve and deserve what they get’” 
(Kasperbauer, 2015: 218). Finally, the 
most obvious example of cognitive bias-
es in public decision- making is that of 
framing, which will be scrutinized in the 
following section.8
Just how influential are the bad 
choice and influence phenomena? One 
could assume that, as the list of biases 
becomes longer, the ways of influencing 
citizens become correspondingly broad-
er since both phenomena rely on cogni-
tive biases. Authors who discuss the 
nudge, which is a technical term for 
choice architects’ method of influencing 
behavior, believe that the cognitive cost 
should never be so high as to make it 
impossible for individuals to resist the 
influence if free choice is to be main-
tained. This means cognitive biases 
come with varying degrees of cognitive 
cost and should not be considered deter-
ministic, as individuals are often able to 
overcome them. There might, however, 
be further worries. One is that the list of 
cognitive heuristics keeps expanding and 
many of our choices might be burdened 
by several cognitive biases simultane-
ously. Another is that we might be wrong 
in assessing the weight of the cognitive 
costs and that they are, in fact, greater 
than we have supposed earlier. Prospects 
for maintaining free choice would then 
be bleak but it gives us even better rea-
sons for involving choice architects in 
our moral considerations, at least at 
times when we think coercion might be 
unacceptable.
8 These are only a few cognitive biases that 
have been proposed in the literature. For an 
introduction into the expansive list of biases, 
see Tversky and Kahneman (1974) and 
Thaler and Sunstein (2008).
Are choice architects experts proper? 
Although somewhat dispersed in social 
areas of influence, they certainly seem to 
be, according to Christiano’s conditions. 
They hold a significant amount of tested 
true beliefs about their subject matters 
and they possess the skills to test further 
ideas and arguments, including the ex-
tension of arguments of the community 
to new problems within the domain. 
Their debates do exhibit a degree of eso-
tericism (although they are probably 
more successful in expressing their ideas 
to laypersons than scientists from cer-
tain other fields). They hold the exper-
tise needed to assess the cognitive effects 
of particular policies, as well as filter out 
the views based on faulty psychological 
notions. Psychologists and cognitive sci-
entists would then certainly make the 
cut. But the understanding of choice ar-
chitecture stated above could possibly 
include more lines of professional work. 
Public relations specialists, media edi-
tors or mere spin doctors often seem to 
have a good understanding either of the 
documented biases discussed in scientif-
ic research or conventional notions of 
how people’s biases affect their thinking 
and decision-making. Thaler and Sun-
stein seem to be pushing us into this di-
rection when they say that almost any-
one can be a choice architect:
If you design the ballot voters use to 
choose candidates, you are a choice 
architect. If you are a doctor and 
must describe the alternative treat-
ments available to a patient, you are 
a choice architect. If you design the 
form that new employees fill out to 
enroll in the company health care 
plan, you are a choice architect. If 
you are a parent, describing possible 
educational options to your son or 
daughter, you are a choice architect 














































Thaler and Sunstein do, however, 
claim that people may be choice archi-
tects “without realizing it” (2008: 3), 
which would defeat the notion of choice 
architects as possessors of specialized 
knowledge. Even then, we might say that 
many individuals in their daily lives pre-
dictably and successfully influence those 
around them based on valid notions 
about cognitive biases in the very same 
way as choice architects do. This should 
still not pose a problem for establishing 
the expertise, as people might use differ-
ent kinds of scientific knowledge in their 
daily lives without challenging the ex-
perts of the associated field. The groups 
that do pose a problem for drawing a 
threshold for expertise are the commu-
nication and public relations specialists 
that I mentioned above, as they actively 
and purposefully shape democracy’s 
cognitive architecture. They are certain-
ly part of the reason why we want to 
think about choice architecture’s in-
volvement with deliberative democracy 
in the first place. It follows from the ar-
guments above that some choice archi-
tects certainy seen to qualify as experts, 
although it may not be easy to settle 
which of their many manifestations fit 
the expertise bill.
If we agree to the above, we should 
then also note, as I hinted earlier, that 
choice architects may occupy more posi-
tions in the moral division of labor than 
Christiano supposes experts should. 
Like in Christiano’s account, choice ar-
chitects may contribute to a progressive 
debate and research on cognitive biases, 
suggest useful points to politicians and 
administrators, filter out the proposals 
that rely on faulty psychological notions 
and concentrate their research on the 
suggestions of the general citizenry. But 
there are two other ways in which choice 
architects may influence democratic de-
cision-making. On the one hand, they 
can be assigned to pose the relevant 
questions in specific frames and set up 
cognitive architectures for democratic 
discussions, and, on the other hand, they 
may be asked to design nudges that con-
tribute to the realization of policies. The 
third section of this article discusses the 
first kind of influence.9
9 There are two reasons why I do not discuss 
in detail whether choice architects should be 
given the opportunity to nudge citizens in 
their everyday decision-making or whether 
citizens can democratically delegate this re-
sponsibility to choice architects. The first is 
that while frames are inevitable, as I argue 
later in the text, nudges are not. Assigning 
this responsibility to choice architects would 
have to depend on enabling citizens, aware 
of their bounded rationalities and cognitive 
biases, to allow nudging via their institu-
tions. The second is that the consideration of 
whether democracies could incorporate 
nudges would have to hinge on the contro-
versial notion of transparency. The contro-
versy lies in the fact that the effectiveness of 
at least certain nudges depends on them 
working “in the dark” (Bovens, 2009: 209). 
Consider Moles’s example for nudging en-
forceable duties: “The U.K. government has 
produced a guide that aims to reduce tax 
evasion. The guide provides a variety of 
nudges that are effective at reducing fraud. It 
suggests that tax declaration forms should 
be easy to fill in, that the sense of honesty 
can be increased by forcing people to sign 
the declaration before they enter their de-
tails, and that people tend to comply with 
rules when they are aware that most people 
also comply with them” (Moles, 2015). This 
nudge would certainly not be effective if 
people were on the lookout for these tech-
niques. We should remind ourselves that 
Christiano wants public deliberations to ad-
dress the just ways of accommodating peo-
ple’s interests and the means of advancing 
them, and assigns citizens the role of assess-
ing whether policy-making is faithfully pur-
suing their aims and values. This would not 
























Some people might object that 
choice architects are mere manipulators 
and that there is no place for them in a 
division of labor that tends to be moral, 
since manipulation is wrong. They might 
see the inclusion of choice architects as a 
reason for rethinking the principal agent 
problem, which Christiano himself wants 
to overcome. They would certainly be 
right in arguing that many politicians, 
lobbyists, spin doctors, media workers 
and adpersons try and often succeed in 
capitalizing on people’s cognitive frail-
ties and bypassing their rational agency 
for personal benefit. Choice architecture 
endorsers claim, however, that believing 
the above would be missing the bigger 
picture. The ballot designing example 
from Thaler and Sunstein proves that 
there are a myriad ways in which indi-
viduals can be influenced in their public 
decision-making but it also seems to re-
mind us that ballots still need to be de-
signed in some way. The same may be 
said for agenda-setting in political as-
semblies or posing a particular question 
in a referendum. Choice environments, 
then, seem to be inevitable, for “it is im-
possible to avoid any sort of structuring 
working in the dark, aside, perhaps, from 
looking at the outcomes. One solution to the 
problem might be Bovens’s distinction be-
tween type inference transparency, which is 
the transparency of the types of nudges be-
ing used and token inference transparency, 
which concerns the particular content of 
nudges (2009: 216-217). It is not obvious 
whether Christiano would be satisfied with 
type inference transparency only. In any 
case, although these issues are important for 
Christiano’s view, they would require a sepa-
rate article, and I am leaving them for future 
work. For an introduction into the transpar-
ency issue, see Bovens (2009) and Hansen 
and Jespersen (2013). For an account of de-
mocratically acceptable nudging, see Heintz 
(work in progress).
and influencing of people’s choices even 
if unintentional” (Blumenthal-Barby, 
2013: 186). Hence, the moral question 
should not be whether choice architects 
are to be included in a moral division of 
labor but how they should be included 
so that people are able to pursue their 
interests and communicate their values 
in public deliberation.
Also, choice architects need not only 
rely on nudging, nor is nudging always 
manipulative. Choice architects can help 
ordinary citizens recognize and avoid 
biases or they may attempt to “de- bias” 
individual decision-making. Since we 
would want democratic decision- mak-
ing to be fair and the decisions to ap-
proximate citizens’ authentic values, this 
is exactly what we expect choice archi-
tects to do most of the time. Thus, a 
choice architect’s contribution might be, 
for example, clarifying a referendum 
question or eliminating all the parts of 
the question that may trigger a recog-
nized bias.
One final worry might be that if 
choice architects are indeed experts, they 
might be very bad experts, as they are 
themselves susceptible to cognitive bias-
es and heuristics when they design choice 
architectures, just as ordinary citizens 
are when they are responding to choice 
architectures. Blumenthal-Barby offers 
two responses. The first is that choice 
architects are still less susceptible to bi-
ases, seeing that there is a difference be-
tween how they cognitively operate in 
everyday life, on the one hand, and when 
they design choice architectures, on the 
other. When choice architects help oth-
ers with their decisions, they are capable 
of a certain distance that individuals are 
not in their own cases (Blumenthal-Bar-
by, 2013: 184-185). The second is that 
choice architecture is still better than the 














































be affected by unstructured choice envi-
ronments leading them to bad choices. 
So even if choice architects are biased in 
their design, that prospect still seems 
better than allowing the environment to 
stay unchecked (Blumenthal-Barby, 2013: 
184).
Now that I have presented a solid 
case for why choice architects should be 
included in the realm of experts, and 
proved that their role is important due to 
the prevalence of cognitive biases, I will 
now turn to framing effects, which are 
the central focus of a sub-group of choice 
architects – democracy architects.
3. Democracy Architects
Thaler and Sunstein cite studies ac-
cording to which it is possible to predict 
the winners of congressional elections 
simply by glancing at pictures of candi-
dates and stating which one looks more 
competent (2008: 20). The studies de-
monstrate that individuals who were 
previously not familiar with the candi-
dates could correctly predict the out-
come of the election two-thirds of the 
time (Todorov et al., 2005;  Benjamin 
and Shapiro, 2009). This is a very bleak 
prospect and we can only hope citizens’ 
political judgments are more responsive 
to reasons than these studies suggest. In 
this section, I discuss framing effects 
and the role of framing specialists, who I 
here refer to as democracy architects. 
This group of experts is particularly sig-
nificant to Christiano’s project, as frames 
may come to create static in the commu-
nication between ordinary citizens and 
policy makers. In order for ordinary cit-
izens to communicate their values au-
thentically and for politicians to pick up 
on these values, the frames will have to 
cause the least possible interference. De-
mocracy architects are experts not on 
what is communicated but how things 
are communicated. They also share in 
valuable knowledge for citizens’ deci-
sion-making.
Once again, as in the case of choice 
architects, there are different ways in 
which we can conceptualize the exper-
tise of democracy architects depending 
on the notion of framing. One is a nar-
rower concept that scrutinizes, decon-
structs and utilizes the framing effects 
recognized by the cognitive heuristics 
literature as they occur in distinct de-
cision-making situations. The broader 
concept refers to the setting up of cogni-
tive architecture within which the whole 
debate takes place but which may not 
refer to any particular instances of 
choice. Consider the following example 
for the latter category: over the past sev-
eral years, the Occupy movements have 
often organized their debates in wide 
and inclusive plenary sessions. In stu-
dent occupations of universities, for in-
stance, it was often claimed that the ple-
nary sessions were of a very egalitarian 
character. There were no explicit time 
restraints, which allowed every individ-
ual to state their opinions and concerns 
as an equal participant and vote for or 
against certain proposals. But some ob-
jectors stated that the plenary sessions 
were not, in fact, egalitarian as the agen-
da for the sessions was set by the organ-
izers before the sessions started. Know-
ing that single sessions could last for 
hours and be extremely tiring, the agen-
da-setters would often consciously or-
ganize sessions so that the “more impor-
tant” issues were handled first, while the 
“more trifling” ones were pushed to the 
end. This is just to show that a wider 
cognitive architecture for debates will 
often depend on the moderator’s value 
judgments. The moderators will often 
bring about these effects completely in-
























pacify or animate the participants may 
also be possible. For instance, the extent 
of conflict and controversy stirred up by 
a particular issue might often depend on 
how much conflict there was during the 
discussion of the preceding issue. As 
moderators attempt to drive the meeting 
to settle particular points of the agenda, 
they are the ones who usually frame (in 
the narrower sense of the word) the 
question that is going to be voted on. 
The matters of agenda-setting and ques-
tion-framing can both be, and indeed 
often are, challenged by plenary partici-
pants but the extent to which these chal-
lenges are performed will depend on 
how much participants want to ‘waste 
time on technicalities’ and to what ex-
tent they are able to notice controversies 
around how the agenda was set or the 
questions framed. My aim with the 
above was not to say that these direct 
democracies are useless gatherings do-
mi nated by ideologically driven groups 
or that they are unsuccessful in develop-
ing people’s skills of deliberation. It is 
merely to show that cognitive architec-
tures around democratic deliberation 
will have to be set in some way, and it is 
of moral concern to ensure that this in-
hibits the communication of values to 
the least possible extent. I also intended 
to demonstrate that effects on delibera-
tive contexts stretch beyond the framing 
effects in their usual understanding. I 
do, however, turn to these now.
Framing effects occur when individ-
uals arrive at different choices in deci-
sions with the same content, thus col-
lapsing rational choice theory’s invari-
ance principle. This principle “requires 
that individuals ignore arbitrary changes 
to the presentation of a choice scenario 
and focus only on outcomes”, although 
that “does not entail that human deci-
sions will be chaotic, random, or ulti-
mately unpredictable” (Kelly, 2012: 11). 
The literature is abundant with examples 
showing that the susceptibility to fram-
ing effects is universal and that it may 
not depend strongly on education lev-
els.10 This means that the role of the de-
mocracy architect should not be limited 
to educating ordinary citizens and 
pointing out biases. There are a number 
of ways in which framing has been noted 
to affect people’s decisions, such as the 
order in which certain questions are 
posed, how they are worded (Kelly, 2012: 
16-18) but, most notably, how framing 
may be combined and utilized with oth-
er cognitive heuristics. Take Kelly’s ex-
ample of, what he calls, a Rawlsian frame 
that a legislator might use to nudge peo-
ple into supporting the difference prin-
ciple:
Imagine that our legislator knows 
that people are affected by framing, 
and that she also knows that individ-
uals are hostile to frames that repre-
sent a move away from the status 
quo. She must decide between the 
equivalent formulations of a propos-
al to raise taxes:
(a) Raise taxes by 2 percent over last 
year; 
(b) Maintain the same rate of in-
crease (2 percent) as in previous year 
(Kelly, 2013: 224).
Kelly claims that individuals are 
more likely to respond to (b) rather than 
(a) due to a status quo bias, i.e., prefer-
ring that something is ‘maintained’ and 
that, in a manner of speaking, things re-
main stable. If Kelly is right, then de-
mocracy architects should not only be 
well-briefed on the varieties of ways in 
which framing effects may influence de-
cision-making but also on the various 
10 See, for example, McNeil et al. (1982) and 














































biases that may coincide with them in 
order to design architectures to avoid 
these biases.11
It should be clear by now that frames 
are inevitable and that the moral issue at 
hand should not be whether we have 
reasons to employ specialists on framing 
or not but, instead, how knowledge 
about the cognitive effects of framing 
might be cultivated to serve good deci-
sion-making. In this case, good deci-
sion-making entails the transmission of 
authentic values and aims from citizens 
to the rest of the political system and 
their implementation in public policy 
curtailed by principles of egalitarian jus-
tice. As Kelly notes, “the regular framing 
of decisions is an important (and per-
haps indispensable) simplifying device 
for public debate and discussion” (Kelly, 
2012: 38). Skeptics, however, may re-
main unconvinced. Their worry would 
be that in a social world flooded with 
framing effects, the expression of citi-
zens’ values and aims might further be 
tainted by involving even more framing 
effects specialists. They would further 
claim that government officials are well- 
intentioned and guided by principles of 
egalitarian justice only in philosophical 
11 One objection coming from the literature is 
that with such an expansive list of cognitive 
biases working in unison with one another, 
as the example shows, there is little sense in 
discussing the ‘authenticity’ of people’s pref-
erences. Without much theoretical support, 
I agree with Christiano who believes people 
are able to cultivate a deep understanding of 
their values and of their interests. Kelly 
seems to support this view by stating that 
even “in behavioral economics, the con-
struction of preferences has not been taken 
to entail that all choices are uniquely de-
pendent on the context of elicitation”, and 
that the image “of all voters as passive, easily 
manipulated stooges is misleading” (Kelly, 
2012: 23).
discussions and that appointing profes-
sionals to assume control over frames in 
democratic deliberation is a high-risk 
maneuver, regardless of whether frames 
are inevitable or not. But if the citizenry 
at large becomes acquainted with the 
presence of framing effects and a vibrant 
debate on how professionals are tackling 
cognitive frames in deliberation gets go-
ing, the work of framing professionals 
would be more contested than it cur-
rently is in democratic societies. In fact, 
this view appears to be quite similar to 
Christiano’s arguments about other ex-
perts. I will return to this discussion in 
the final section of this article.
I will end this section by presenting 
one last objection to the inclusion of de-
mocracy architects in setting up public 
deliberation. This objection states that 
aside from perhaps referenda, citizens 
in Christiano’s deliberative conception 
rarely encounter situations in which 
they directly decide on particular issues 
but, instead, they delegate these choices 
to politicians who represent their aim 
packages. Therefore, the inclusion of 
framing specialists is superfluous. There 
are two ways to address this objection. 
Firstly, if citizens are in fact responsive 
to arguments and do not merely choose 
based on the candidates’ looks on TV, 
then they will try to sort out where their 
values and aims lie in the issues that are 
presented to them – in frames. And if it 
is a frame affecting an individual’s evalu-
ation of a particular candidate based on 
the position he is taking on a particular 
policy, then the entire choice of candi-
dates will often depend on a seductive 
framing effect. Secondly, it is naïve to 
think politicians are not subject to fram-
ing effects themselves. Although, unlike 
citizens, most politicians get a fair 
amount of practice in how to sway pub-
lic opinion using rhetorical and psycho-
























themselves experts on cognitive biases. 
Therefore, there are reasons to believe 
politicians too need the aid of democra-
cy architects.
I now turn to the final section, where 
I will discuss possible mechanisms to 
alleviate the problems of correctness, in 
the sense of communicating values, which 
are posed by framing effects and other 
cognitive biases. I will decide whether 
Christiano’s account of an epistemic de-
liberative democracy is sufficient in can-
celing out the problems that I have been 
discussing or it is in need of some addi-
tions and/or concessions.
4. Solutions and Concluding Remarks
I would like to start this section by 
studying whether we can find solutions 
to the problems of biases in Christiano’s 
own account on experts and deliberative 
democracy. Let us first check whether 
Christiano’s solutions for overcoming 
the principal agent problem deal with 
cognitive biases as a side-effect. The 
strategy of an overlapping understand-
ing (Christiano, 2012: 38-40), which I 
have discussed in the opening section, 
certainly seems to help with communi-
cating expert knowledge about cognitive 
biases to the citizenry at large, and is the 
first step in warning them about cogni-
tive effects. It also enables politicians to 
produce ‘behaviorally-enlightened’ poli-
cy, even if they do not have a full grasp of 
the scientific information (Christiano, 
2012: 40). Furthermore, it exposes the 
experts to cognitive biases (not choice 
architects yet!) and their discussions on 
non-expert monitoring (Christiano, 2012: 
40). Beyond that, experts on cognitive 
biases might also be subject to demo-
cratic sanctions. If a significant number 
of experts in a particular field argue that 
a particular policy is not geared toward 
bringing the intended results, those ex-
perts who participated in the making of 
the policy – as well as politicians who 
relied on their opinion – might be 
shamed as a consequence (Christiano, 
2012: 41). In such circumstances, the 
experts failing to provide adequate ex-
pert knowledge might be dismissed by 
their legislators and other competing 
experts might be assigned with their re-
sponsibilities (Christiano, 2012: 41). In 
the case of experts on cognitive biases, 
this might happen if the experts falsely 
interpret the expected biases that a poli-
cy may cause or alleviate in citizens’ de-
cision-making or if they fail to notice 
strong framing effects in the way a cer-
tain question was posed or a policy dis-
played for public scrutiny. Experts on 
cognitive biases would certainly be in 
the center of Christiano’s attention, as he 
seems to be emphasizing scientific theo-
ries which evidently have the capacity 
for solving social problems. These ex-
perts are one of the most obviously capa-
ble groups for such a task, as they ana-
lyze the causes for people’s systematic 
errors, and arrange choice environments 
to alleviate them. A proponent of an 
epistemic account of democracy, like the 
one Christiano proposes, could argue 
that deliberative democracy has an in-
herent capacity to deliver correct deci-
sions, even with cognitive biases taken 
into account. It is the view that an active 
deliberative landscape in modern de-
mocracies has the capacity of regulating 
itself and overcoming bias. The burden 
of proof, however, is on the proponent of 
this view.12
I do not believe active deliberation 
would suffice on its own. It would incul-
cate the citizens with a large amount of 















































passive awareness and education about 
cognitive biases, but let us not forget that 
the inability of citizens to grasp the 
abundance of expert knowledge relevant 
for decision-making is what got us into 
the division of labor debate in the first 
place. Additionally, Christiano's sanc-
tions might actually support the argu-
ment that we need choice architects, as it 
is assumed that experts collaborating 
with legislators might do a better job if 
they are directly involved in policy-mak-
ing. Moreover, as choice architects are 
problem-solvers in a very direct sense, 
Christiano’s theory seems to be calling 
for them at this point as well.
Kelly, on the other hand, also con-
siders whether a competition of different 
frames in democracy, in the form of di-
verse instances of political speech, miti-
gates the effects of framing over time. He 
states that if we assume that “competi-
tion between frames tends to improve 
the quality of decision making over what 
can be expected in noncompetitive set-
tings, the promotion of competition 
should be a priority for anyone interest-
ed in bolstering the epistemic value of 
democracy” (2012: 100). This would 
support Christiano’s case and possibly 
suggest that vibrant public deliberation 
that he conceives might, in fact, be able 
to overcome cognitive biases. But the 
data Kelly discusses is not conclusive, 
nor are framing effects the only cogni-
tive bias we need to take into account. 
For this reason, he proposes several in-
sulating strategies, such as judicial re-
view and risk review (2012: 112-119).
My hope is that the inclusion of 
choice architects, together with Chris-
tiano’s mechanisms for expert contesta-
tion, will suffice both in tackling the is-
sues of cognitive biases as well as keeping 
the activities of choice architects in 
check. More specifically, in a social space 
saturated with different kinds of frames, 
specialists, who decrease the amount 
and strength of biases in democratic de-
cision-making as well as point out bias 
triggering frames by different social 
agents, can help citizens. My conclusion 
is that choice architects (or at least de-
mocracy architects) should be added to 
Christiano’s account of a moral division 
of labor in order to facilitate the commu-
nication of citizens’ values and aims to 
the political system and help citizens 
deconstruct frames in which imple-
mented policies are represented.13
Finally, should something be reme-
died about Christiano's account? One 
thing we might want to increase is citi-
zens’ participation in direct deliberation. 
My view here is that together with the 
help of choice architects and the contest-
ing expert community citizens can do 
much for the avoidance of cognitive bi-
ases if they simply employ their discus-
sion and decision-making skills. James 
Druckman says that deliberation might, 
to a limited extent, alleviate the effects of 
framing. He notes that in groups where 
people were exposed to different com-
peting frames and then deliberated about 
them, the framing effects were reduced 
13 One final problem of including experts on 
cognitive biases and, more narrowly, choice 
architects is the nature of disagreements in 
the field, similar to the complication Chris-
tiano mentions about economists not being 
able to agree on good policy (2012: 41). Kel-
ly explicitly says the literature on behavioral 
models of choice is underdeveloped: “Be-
cause the literature has become so vast, and 
so much of it remains controversial, it is not 
yet possible to speak conclusively about a 
single, unified, and complete behavioral 
model of choice” (2012: 9). But some cogni-
tive biases in the literature are widely estab-
lished and firmly rooted, and the disagree-

























(Druckman, 2004: 683). The frequency 
of exposure to and participation in di-
rect deliberative processes, in my opin-
ion, encourages individuals to think 
about how issues and questions are 
posed to them, and then challenge them 
(as was my personal experience in the 
plenary sessions). Participation in such 
democratic processes may also help peo-
ple express their values more directly, if 
politicians are attentive enough to lend 
them an ear. What this brings into ques-
tion, with reference to Christiano’s ac-
count, is the predominantly top-down 
character of communicating values and 
aims. We may want to go back to the 
drawing board and rethink the number 
and extent of citizen’s tasks in a delibera-
tive democracy. Citizens may be asked 
to actively participate in workplace de-
mocracies or community gatherings, 
and legislators may need to encourage 
the adoption of such forms of micro- 
governance. This, I believe, represents a 
strong insulation strategy for the protec-
tion of citizens from systematic biases.
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Christianov deliberativni ekspertizam i arhitektura izbora
SAŽETAK Članak proučava poziciju Thomasa Christiana o moralnoj podjeli rada u demo-
kraciji. Christianovo uključivanje stručnjaka služi umanjivanju epistemičkih tereta koje 
obični građani moraju podnositi pri demokratskom odlučivanju i umanjivanju količine 
rada kojeg na sebe u protivnom moraju preuzimati u modernoj demokraciji. Srž mojeg 
doprinosa raspravi leži u rasuđivanju o tome nosi li se Christianova pozicija uspješno s 
problemima kognitivnih pristranosti, od kojih ljudi pate pri komuniciranju svojih vrijed-
nosti u demokratskom odlučivanju. Tvrdim da Christianovo shvaćanje stručnosti mora 
biti prošireno kako bi uključilo arhitekte izbora, koji posjeduju znanja o metodama utje-
canja na donošenje odluka. Također tvrdim da je arhitektura izbora društvena činjenica 
koju informirana deliberativna demokratska teorija mora uzeti u obzir.
KLJUČNE RIJEČI epistemička deliberativna demokracija, stručnjaci, arhitektura izbora, 
 demokratski arhitekti, kognitivne pristranosti, učinci kognitivnih okvira
